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ABSTRACT: "Where my health is concerned, cost is no ob-
ject." The reply of the penniless man to an expensive spe-
cialist reflects a moral question. Should the costs of health
services be a significant consideration in deciding upon gov-
ernmental health policies and programs? The answer in my
opinion is yes. Costs ought to be used in deciding the level
of health activities versus other social goods and services, and
in planning which health programs to support. The truly moral
problem is not to distinguish between good and evil but rather
to select appropriately among alternative goods. After argu-
ing that consideration of cost is a moral imperative, the useful-
ness of cost-benefit analysis in framing the right questions and
in improving the chances of moving in directions of social
improvement is urged, and some limitations are noted. Fi-
nally, examples of the use of cost-effectiveness analysis in
studying problems of disease control and maternal and child
health are given.
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HE MEANING of cost, in a gen-
Teral sense, is that of sacrifice. Web-
ster’s Second International defines cost
as &dquo;... whatever, as labor, self-denial,
suffering, etc., is requisite to secure
benefit.&dquo;
In economic analysis, as employed in
cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness studies,
costs are benefits lost. They are the
result of a decision to forego benefits
that could otherwise be obtained. What
we decide to do has as its costs those
good things we cannot achieve because
of the decision to apply our resources in
a particular way.’
A decision to invest more of society’s
resources in health programs means that
less will be invested in education, hous-
ing, transportation, national security,
space exploration, or private consump-
tion. The costs of the addition to health
programs are the foregone benefits from
the best mix of additions to these others.
Whether the cost is worthwhile depends
on our values and on our ability to esti-
mate and evaluate the benefits from the
various alternatives.
In deciding how we might best use
resources in the field of health, the cost
of an investment in research or hospital
construction may be the benefits fore-
gone in extending access to current
health services. The cost of saving lives
by expanding a tuberculosis control pro-
gram is the lives that might be saved
by expanding a cervical cancer program,
if both cannot be done because the avail-
able resources are limited.
Ivan Illich has put this concept force-
fully in regard to modernization:
Each car which Brazil puts on the road
denies fifty people good transportation by
bus. Each merchandized refrigerator re-
duces the chance of building a community
freezer. Every dollar spent in Latin
America on doctors and hospitals costs a
hundred lives.... Had each dollar been
spent on providing safe drinking water, a
hundred lives could have been saved.2
If, then, the costs of a decision are
those things we most prize-human life,
reduction of suffering, enhancement of
the quality of life, protection of the de-
pendent-then consideration of such
costs should be a serious element in such
decisions.
Perhaps the preceding belabors the
obvious. But the outraged reactions of
many of those in the humanitarian pro-
fessions to &dquo;setting a price on human
life&dquo; results often from a misunderstand-
ing of the true nature of costs as con-
siderations in decision-making. The
cost of saving a human life is not to be
measured in dollars, but rather in terms
of alternative lives to be saved or other
social values sacrificed. A dramatic
battle over the costs and benefits of
alternative allocations of health re-
sources took place in China in the past
few years. A decision to shift physi-
cians, nurses, and sanitarians to rural
areas had great consequences in benefits
lost to urban centers and to health pro-
fessionals.3
If the concept of economic cost is such
a desirable one to apply, is it difficult in
practice to do so? Of course it is. One
difficulty is that the benefits we compare
are measurable only in very different
dimensions. Health programs may have
1. For good discussions of economic cost,
see James M. Buchanan, Cost and Choice
(Chicago: Markham, 1969) ; R. H. Coase,
"The Nature of Costs," in Studies in Cost
Analysis, David Solomons, ed. (Homewood,
Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1968), pp. 118-133;
and Robert E. Bickner, "Concepts of Eco-
nomic Cost," in Gene H. Fisher, Cost Consid-
erations in Systems Analysis (New York:
American Elsevier, 1971), pp. 24-62.
2. Ivan D. Illich, Celebration of Awareness
(New York: Doubleday, 1970), p. 163.
3. Descriptions of events and issues are in
various issues of Current Scene&mdash;Developments
in Mainland China: "Mao’s Revolution in
Public Health," May 1, 1968; "The Mao-Liu
Controversy over Rural Public Health," June
15, 1969; "Public Health Developments&mdash;Con&mdash;
tinued Focus on Farms," December 15, 1969.
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as ultimate benefits the reduction of
premature death, reduction of disabling
conditions, reduction in suffering, abil-
ity to function better socially and at
given tasks. Resources expended on
arthritis control may reduce pain and
disablement, but will have little effect
on mortality rates. Other programs,
such as the artificial kidney or heart
transplants, may have their primary
effect in postponing death.
When we consider measuring health
program costs in their effects on pro-
grams foregone in education or housing,
the dimensions of benefit are even more
difficult to compare.
The inability to measure benefits in
commensurable units does not mean that
costs (foregone benefits) cannot be esti-
mated and compared. It does mean,
however, that judgments and political
processes must be used to make the
choices. Cost analysis makes these
decisions better informed, so that we
know more about how social values may
be best realized.
In the search for commensurability,
attempts have been made to reduce
benefits to a common denominator, usu-
ally dollars. But agreement on dollar
values is unlikely.
The problem of incommensurability is
only one in a long list of measurement
difficulties. We lack knowledge of the
outputs or benefits of past and existing
programs and projects, let alone those of
future programs which may be foregone.
But if we recognize the necessity for
cost (and therefore benefit) information,
then we may put a higher value on
evaluation and analysis of programs.
The development of production func-
tions to give us greater insight into rela-
tions among resources, techniques, and
outputs is a high priority item for
better decision-making.4 4
To illustrate some of the problems of
estimating costs and benefits of health
programs, as well as their use in aiding
budget decisions and legislative propos-
als, two studies done at the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare are
summarized.
DISEASE CONTROL PROGRAMS
One of the first analytical studies at
the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare was one on disease control
programs then under way. Considerable
work had been done during the last ten
years in estimating the economic costs
of particular diseases. Among the best
known of these are Rashi Fein’s Eco-
nomics of Mental Illness, Burton Weis-
brod’s Economics of Public Health (in
which he estimated the costs of cancer,
tuberculosis, and poliomyelitis), Herb-
ert Klarman’s paper on syphilis control
programs, and Dorothy Rice’s studies
covering the international classification
of diseases. A generation earlier, Dub-
lin and Lotka’s classic study explored
the impacts of disease and disability
and their relation to changes in earning
power. The economic implications of
disability were, of course, a matter of
central interest in the area of workmen’s
compensation insurance. It was not
surprising, then, that when systematic
quantitative analysis of government pro-
grams and policies began to spread from
defense to civilian applications, one of
the first analytical studies was a study
of disease-control programs.
HEW supports, or could support, a
number of categorical disease control
programs whose objectives are, or would
be, to save lives or to prevent disability
by controlling specific diseases. The
study was therefore an attempt to
answer the question: If additional
money were to be allocated to disease
4. The relation of analysis and political de-
cisions is well discussed in Charles L.
Schultze, The Politics and Economics of Pub-
lic Spending (Washington: Brookings Institu-
tion, 1968), pp. 55-76.
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TABLE I-CANCER CONTROL PROGRAM
1966-1972
SOURCE: The Analysis and EvaluaLion of Public Expenditures: The PPB System, U. S. Con-
gress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Economy in Government, 1969.
control programs, which programs
would show the highest payoff in terms
of lives saved and disability prevented
per dollar spent? The study defined
disease liberally. Motor vehicle acci-
dents were included, together with tu-
berculosis, syphilis, cancer, and ar-
thritis.
These programs are not research ac-
tivities but those in which a technology
exists, and the problem is whether to
put the same, more, or fewer federal
funds behind these control programs to
support activities in hospitals, states,
and communities. The question ad-
dressed is where to allocate the re-
sources available for this purpose.
Table 1 illustrates the approach to
one set of diseases, cancer. HEW
looked at cancer of the uterine cervix,
breast, head and neck, and colon-rectum.
Estimates were made of cost per exami-
nation and the probable number of ex-
aminations that would be required for
each case found. From this was derived
the number of cases that would be
found for a given expenditure level, and
estimates of the cost per case found.
An estimate was made of the number
of deaths that could be averted by the
treatment following the detection of the
cancer, and then the cost per death
averted was calculated; this ranged
from about $2,200 in the case of cervical
cancer up to $40,000 to $45,000 in the
case of head-and-neck and colon-rectum
cancer.
On the vertical axis of figure 1 are
plotted the program costs; these include
the cost of the treatment in addition
to the federal detection program. On
the horizontal axis, estimates of deaths
averted are ordered by the increase in
cost per death averted in each program.
Segments of the curve identified for
each disease cover the extent of the pro-
gram which it was estimated could be
mounted in the years 1968-1972 before
running into sharply increasing costs.
In concept, the cervical cancer curve is
cut off where costs become higher than
the breast cancer program, and so on.
From this analysis one might say that
if there is available only $50 million,
cervical cancer should get all the funds.
If we have $115 million, then breast
cancer control programs look quite com-
petitive. Head and neck and colon-
rectum cancer detection as subjects of
major control programs did not look
attractive when viewed in this context.
The analysts recommended that these
programs concentrate on research and
development.
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DEATHS AVERTED PER DOLLAR EXPENDED FOR VARIOUS HEALTH/SAFETY MEASURES
FIGURE 1-CANCER PROGRAMS
Horizontal: Deaths Averted-in thousands Vertical: Cost in millions of dollars
SOURCE: See Table 1. * Includes programs on use of seat belts, defensive driving, and
reduction in pedestrian injuries.
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FIGURE 3-DOLLAR SAVING IN CANCER PROGRAMS COMPARED TO OTHER TREATMENT PROGRAMS
Horizontal: Savings in billions of dollars
Vertical: Program costs in millions of dollars
SOURCE: See Table 1.
* Includes programs on use of seat belts, defensive driving, and reduction in pedestrian
injuries.
The same kind of analysis was per-
formed for each of the other, non-cancer
programs studied ( figure 2 ) . There
seemed to be a very high potential pay-
off for certain educational programs in
motor vehicle injury prevention: trying
to persuade people to use seatbelts, not
to walk in front of a car, and so on.
And then as we move up this curve,
again ordered by cost of averting death,
we begin adding the others.
This particular criterion, deaths
averted, was not completely satisfactory.
The number of fatalities attributed to
arthritis was negligible, and so is not
shown. Secondly, there was the ques-
tion, did it matter who died? Did it
matter whether it was a thirty-year-old
mother or a forty-year-old father of a
family or a seventy-five-year-old grand-
father ? On Figure 3, dollar-savings to-
taling the avoided medical treatments
and a crude estimate of the average
(discounted) lifetime earnings saved
are plotted as a variable in place of
deaths averted. There are two changes
in results: Cervical cancer and syphilis
control programs change places in pri-
ority order, and we are able to intro-
duce the arthritis program.
These studies were not greeted with
universal acclaim. Criticisms focused
on a number of problems. First, with
almost no exception the conclusions
were based on average relationships.
That is, the total benefits were divided
by the total costs.
There was little evidence of what the
actual impact of increasing or decreas-
ing programs by small amounts might
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TREATMENT COSTS COMPARED FOR HYPOTHETICAL DISEASES
be. If we actually believed the average
ratios to be valid at the margin, ought
we not to put all our funds into the
program with the highest benefit-cost or
deaths-averted-per-dollar ratios?
Let me illustrate with a hypothetical
example of how such marginal informa-
tion might be used to determine the pre-
ferred mix of disease control programs.
Assume that we can determine, as in
tables 2 and 3, the number of lives saved
by different expenditures on disease A
and disease B.
If we knew only the effect of spending
$1 million, we might opt for a program
where all our money went toward con-
trolling disease A, by which we could
save 465 lives instead of the 270 saved
if we spent it all on disease B. Simi-
larly, if we knew only the effects of pro-
grams using a half million dollars, we
would probably prefer A, as we would
save 360 rather than only 200 lives.
But if we knew the results for ex-
penditures of both a half million dollars
and $1 million in each program, we
would quickly see that spending half our
money in each program was better than
putting it all in one, assuming we have
$1 million available.
But suppose we had still more dis-
crete data, as in table 4, which gives us
the effect of each hundred thousand
dollars spent on each control program.
We could then spend the million dollars
even more effectively, as in table 5.
The lack of marginal data resulted
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from both a lack of such data for most
programs and a lack of economic sophis-
tication on the part of the Public Health
Service analysts who performed the
studies. Despite the theoretical short-
comings, the results were useful when
applied with some common sense.
Practical obstacles of existing com-
mitments made it almost impossible to
recommend reductions in any program.
So the decisions dealt with the alloca-
tion of modest increments.
In the case of oral and colon-rectum
cancer, the average cost per death
averted seemed so high that the depart-
ment recommended emphasis on research
and development rather than on a con-
trol program to demonstrate and extend
current technology.
In cervical cancer, investigation indi-
cated a sizable number of hospitals in
low socio-economic areas without detec-
tion programs which would be willing to
establish these if supported by federal
funds. The unit cost of increasing the
number of hospitals seemed to be the
same as that of those already in the
program. Shifting the approach to
reach out for additional women in the
community would increase costs per ex-
amination but not so much as to change
the relative position of this program.
At most, it raised costs to about those
of the breast cancer control program.
Despite the seemingly high potential
payoff of some of the motor vehicle pro-
grams, there was considerable uncer-
tainty about the success. As a conse-
quence, recommendations were for small
programs with a large emphasis on eval-
uation for use in future decisions. The
same philosophy was applied to the
arthritis program.
Programs were classified into cate-
gories by relative pay-off (deaths
averted; savings) and certainty of re-
sult. Thus, a matrix of four possibili-
ties might be drawn, as in figure 4.
Some of the programs falling within
FIGURE 4-PROGRAMS CLASSIFIED BY
MAGNITUDE AND CERTAINTY OF RESULT
these possibilities are inserted for illus-
tration.
In programs for which the pay-off
looked very good, and with relative con-
fidence in the calculations, recommenda-
tions for substantial increases in funding
were made. Where the pay-off looked
high but was rated with considerable
uncertainty, as in educational programs
to stimulate use of restraining devices
in automobiles, modest funding was sug-
gested with large evaluation components
to buy more information. Where re-
sults looked relatively poor, it was rec-
ommended that no additions to program
be made, and that investment might
better be placed in additional research to
develop improved screening techniques,
epidemiological knowledge, or therapy.
The analyses and recommendations
were fed into the decision-making proc-
ess, which also considers existing com-
mitments, the political situation, feasible
changes in the rates of spending, the
ability to get people moving on pro-
grams, and so on.
What resulted, then, was a setting of
priorities for additional funding, based
on the analytical results, judgment about
their reliability, and practical considera-
tions.
A second type of criticism of the
analysis described above was concerned
with the criteria, especially the calcula-
tion of benefits. They were considered
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inadequate in that they paid attention
to economic productivity alone, and
omitted other considerations. In par-
ticular, they were thought to discrimi-
nate against the old who might be past
employment years, and women whose
earnings were relatively low. It was
also feared that the logic, if vigorously
pursued, would penalize not only health
programs for the aged such as the newly
launched Medicare, but also programs
aimed at assisting the poor, whose rela-
tive earning power is low by definition.
In actual practice in the programs
studied, these concerns were only hypo-
thetical. The programs for cervical and
breast cancer, limited, of course, to
women, seemed to be good. As for the
poor, most of the programs considered,
especially cervical cancer, syphilis, and
tuberculosis, were directed primarily at
them, and projects were usually located
to serve low-income residents.
Another type of objection was raised
not against the technique of analysis,
but against its being done at all.
Choices among diseases to be controlled
and concern with costs of saving lives
can be viewed as contrary to physicians’
attitudes in the care of an individual
patient. Yet, such decisions are made,
analysis or no. Prior decisions on allo-
cations to various health problems rested
upon a combination of perception of the
magnitude of the problem and the po-
litical strength organized to obtain fund-
ing, as in the National Tuberculosis
Association.
The disease control cost-benefit analy-
ses suggest that additional considerations
are very relevant. Given scarce re-
sources-and if resources are not scarce,
there is no allocation problem-one
ought to estimate the costs of achieving
improvement in health. If we can save
more lives by applying resources to a
small problem-in numbers affected-
rather than a large one, we ought to
consider doing so.
MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH
PROGRAMS
In regard to maternal and child-care
programs, the stated goal was to make
needed maternal and child health ser-
vices available and accessible to all, in
particular to all expectant mothers and
children in health-depressed areas.
Health-depressed areas could be charac-
terized as areas with excessive infant
mortality rates. There is no universal
index of good or bad health among chil-
dren. Two measurable areas were se-
lected : mortality, and the prevalence of
chronic handicapping conditions. Over
a dozen possible programs aimed at
reducing these were examined. On
table 6, three selected programs ad-
dressed to the problem of coverage of
maternal and child health are illustrated,
two of them comprehensive programs of
care to expectant mothers and children.
This table shows the annual effects of
spending the same amount of money,
$10 million a year, in different ways.
The analysts examined comprehensive
care programs covering up to age eight-
een and up to age five, with estimates
based on the best assumptions derived
from the literature and advisers on the
probabilities of prevention of maternal
deaths, premature deaths, infant deaths,
and mental retardation, and handicap-
ping conditions prevented or corrected
by age eighteen. They also looked at a
program of early case-finding and as-
sured treatment which focused on chil-
dren at birth (aged four days) and
again every other year until they were
nine. Expending the same amounts,
the money yields different results de-
pending on where it is put. With re-
spect to reduction of infant mortality,
several other programs had higher pay-
offs than these. For example, a possible
program of intensive-care units for high-
risk newborns was estimated to reduce
annually 367 deaths if we &dquo;put all our
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TABLE 6-YEARLY EFFECTS PER $10,000,000 EXPENDED IN
HEALTH-DEPRESSED AREAS
SouRCE : See Table 1.
eggs in one basket&dquo;; this would cost
about $2 7 thousand per infant death pre-
vented. The programs shown cost about
four times that amount, but they do
other good things, too.
The HEW analysts also looked at
programs with a given amount of money
aimed at reducing the number of chil-
dren who would have decayed and un-
filled teeth by age eighteen (see table
7). Introducing fluoridation programs
in communities which do not possess
them, will, for the same amount of
money ($10 million), give us close to
300,000 fewer children in this condition,
compared to the 44,000 or 18,000 fewer
in the other programs noted. Fluorida-
tion looks like a very attractive pro-
gram. It is so attractive that it could
be inferred that a program as cheap as
this is not being inhibited by lack of
financial support by the federal govern-
ment ; there are other factors at work.
One other program, additional funds
on family planning, looked like a very
good way to reduce not only the number
of infant deaths but also the rate of in-
fant mortality in high-risk communities.
Despite the information difficulties,
several conclusions emerged clearly from
the study. Two of these conclusions
resulted in new legislation being re-
quested from Congress. First, it seemed
clear that a program of early case-find-
ings and treatment of handicapping con-
ditions would have considerable pay-off.
It was also clear that if the large num-
ber of children who do not now have
access to good medical care were to be
provided with pediatric services, an
TABLE 7-REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF CHILDREN WITH DECAYED
TEETH PER $10 MILLION EXPENDED
SOURCE: See Table 1.
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acute shortage of doctors would be pre-
cipitated. Ways have to be found to use
medical manpower more efficiently. The
Social Security Amendments of 1967
include provision for programs of early
case-finding and treatment of children
with handicapping conditions.
These condensed discussions of some
of HEW’s applications of cost-benefit
analysis to disease-control and child
health programs illustrate both the use-
fulness and limitations of such analyses
for decision-making. Issues are sharp-
ened, and quantitative estimates are
developed to reduce the decision-maker’s
uncertainty about costs and effects.
Nevertheless, the multiplicity of dimen-
sions of output and their basic incom-
mensurabilities, both with costs and with
the outputs of other claimants for public
expenditure, still require the use of
value judgments and political consensus.
